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I. INTRODUCTION
A dialogue concerning the intersection between the patent system 
and the antitrust laws has endured since the early 1940s.1 Today, in the 
era of the “new economy,” issues related to the intersection of the patent 
system and the antitrust laws are as pressing as ever due to their 
enormous impact on innovation.  Consequently, scholars, practitioners, 
governmental agencies, and other relevant stakeholders have devoted a 
great deal of attention to the intersection between the two laws and 
engaged in dynamic discussions designed to explore their complex 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL. New York 
University School of Law, LLM degree; Thurgood Marshall School of Law, JD degree.  This article 
was presented as a work in progress at the Association for Global Business Conference in Orlando, 
Florida in November of 2009.  It has received the best paper award. 
 1.  JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942). 
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relationship.2  In this article, I explain the interaction between the two 
laws and describe the ways in which these two extremely important 
areas of government regulation are and are not in tension. I argue that 
the conflict between the two laws is overstated, but the proper balance is 
far from being found.  The reason for that is a notion that the current 
state of the patent system is more of a hindrance than a spur to 
innovation and competition due to overprotection and broadening of 
patent rights, lowering of standards to grant patents, chronic inefficiency 
of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that issues far too many 
“questionable” patents and, as a result of all that, the skyrocketing 
number of issued patents.3
Furthermore, I propose that any meaningful attempt to improve the 
current state of the patent system must center on the fact that patentees 
seek patents under many circumstances, rather than only when they wish 
to protect a newly developed technology from imitation and exploit it 
commercially.4  It is now known that most firms rely on patents the least 
among a variety of methods for protecting the returns from their 
 2.  See DEP’T OF JUSTICE [DOJ], ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2003) (address 
by R. Hewitt Pate, Acting Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division U.S. Department of 
Justice, before the American Intellectual Property Law Association [AIPLA]), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010); FED. TRADE 
COMM’N [FTC], TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; RICHARD 
GILBERT, CPC CONFERENCE: ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A CHANGING 
POLITICAL CLIMATE (2009) (summary of the Antitrust and Intellectual Property in a Changing 
Political Climate Conference, held at UC Berkeley on February 5 and 6, 2009, co-sponsored by the 
Competition Policy Center and the Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law sections of the American 
Bar Association, by Richard Gilbert, Professor of Economics and Chair of the Competition Policy 
Center), available at
http://iber.berkeley.edu/cpc/antitrust_conference_2009/Conference%20Summary.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2010).  See generally DOJ & FTC, ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION, PATENTS AND 
INNOVATION, DAF/COMP/WD(2006)52 (Oct. 3, 2006) (note was jointly submitted by the DOJ and 
the FTC to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] Competition 
Committee), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/IP_US.pdf. 
 3.  The number of issued patents has almost doubled in the last twenty years from 96,725 in 
1990 to 190,121 in 2009.  See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE [USPTO], USPTO ANNUAL 
REPORT: PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai_05_wlt_06.html (last visited February 21, 
2010). 
 4.  See generally WESLEY COHEN, RICHARD NELSON & JOHN WALSH, NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RESEARCH [NBER], PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY 
CONDITION AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT), Working Paper 7552 
(2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.  The authors conducted a survey of nearly 
1500 R&D labs in the US manufacturing sector.  Id. at 14, 17.  This study has been widelycited in 
OECD Policy Roundtable on Competition, Patents and Innovation.  See generally DOJ & FTC, 
supra note 2. 
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inventions and that in no industry are patents identified as the most 
effective appropriability mechanism.5  Because of the current state of the 
patent system, patents have become largely a strategic tool that patentees 
can use solely for anticompetitive reasons, such as blocking competitors’ 
development activities, protecting against infringement suits, and using 
patents as leverage in negotiations over technology rights.6  My 
argument is that preventing reliance on patents for anticompetitive 
reasons that do not concomitantly advance the “Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”7 is crucial for the improvement of the patent system and 
striking the balance with antitrust laws.  We are mistaken to believe that 
seeking an optimal level of patent protection and improving the 
efficiency of the PTO by raising its budget and providing more qualified 
patent examiners will be enough to improve the patent system and 
preclude reliance on patents for “illegitimate” reasons because “patents 
are either two weak or too strong”8 and “improper patents will always be 
issued,”9 regardless of how efficient the PTO might be. 
Commentators have described the current state of the patent system 
as a “perfect storm.”10  However, it is more like a fire that keeps burning 
down the city of innovation.  Trying to resolve the problem and prevent 
the fire from spreading by merely providing more fire trucks and 
firemen to the fire department, or making it much more difficult to 
obtain pyrotechnical devices is naive.  While those measures are 
certainly important, the problem will not be resolved until it is 
determined who is perpetrating the fire and how and why.  Only then an 
adequate response and meaningful punishments can be implemented in 
order to deter future wrongdoings.  This article, therefore, argues in 
favor of allowing a more extensive inquiry into the patentee’s subjective 
 5.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 3, 6. 
 6.  Id. at 17. 
 7.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 8.  See Shubha Ghosh, Intellectual Property Rights:  The View from Competition Policy, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 344, 348-49 (2009). 
 9.  See 2000 United States Patent and Trademark Office: Hearing on H.R. 63-845 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2, 
at 112 (2000) (statement of Rochelle Dreyfuss, Professor, Director of the Engelberg Center for 
Innovation Law and Policy, N.Y.U. School of Law), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63845.000/hju63845_0.HTM (last visited Feb. 
22, 2010). 
10.  See Eric Chabrow, The U.S. Patent System in Crisis, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 20, 2006 
(providing a summary of testimony by John Lerner, Professor, Harvard Business School, before a 
House subcommittee), available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/global-
cio/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=180204145 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
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intent for patenting, which is fairly limited under the current law in both 
pre-grant and post-grant issues.  In particular, this article suggests that 
competition policy with a focus on antitrust intent should be considered 
in the initial review of patent applications, and the approach to intent 
standards in post-grant issues must be more objective across the board, 
so that antitrust law’s “swords” can be used more often in patent cases 
involving allegations of patentee’s misconduct in order to deter future 
misconducts.  However, this article does not suggest by any means that 
antitrust competition authorities should assume responsibilities in the 
initial review of patent applications, or that the patentee’s “improper” 
subjective intent for patenting should make a perfectly valid patent 
unenforceable.  To the contrary, my argument is that the patentee’s 
subjective intent for patenting should not be viewed as a red light at the 
intersection between the patent system and antitrust laws, but it must be 
an important arrow that directs the traffic when other signs are invisible. 
I use Dippin’ Dots Inc. v. Mosey, arguably the second most controversial 
patent case of the last decade, to illustrate this point and to explain the 
cost of the current approach to intent standards in patents.11
The Article is divided as follows. Part II provides a historical 
overview of goals and policy behind both the patent system and antitrust 
laws.  Part III underlines the areas of actual conflict between the two 
laws. Part IV explores possible adjustments that could reduce the 
conflict between the two laws and lead to a proper balance. 
 11.  476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  The most controversial patent case of the last decade is 
probably In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The Federal Circuit court affirmed the 
rejection of the patent claims involving a method of hedging risks in commodities trading.  See
Erick Schonfeld, Your Business Method Patent Has Just Been Invalidated, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Oct. 30, 2008, available at                                                                   
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/30/AR2008103003751.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2010).  It has been widely reported that the In re Bilski decision will call into 
question the validity of many already issued business method patents.  Id.  The Supreme Court of 
the United States granted certiorari on June 1, 2009 and oral argument on the patent applicants’ 
appeal was heard on November 9, 2009.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, In re Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 
3218 (2009) (No. 08-964), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 
2010).  
4
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Goals and Policy Behind Antitrust Laws 
The federal antitrust laws first saw the light of day in the last half of 
the 19th century.12  During that period, industrialization was in full-swing 
in the United States and the common law was deemed inadequate to deal 
with the growth of trusts, such as John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil 
Trust formed in 1882, cartels and industrial monopolies that were 
becoming strong enough to influence prices and outputs and create 
inefficiencies.13  Consequently, Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 
1890 as a legislative response to new conditions in the marketplace.14
The Sherman Act prohibited unreasonable agreements in restraint of 
trade under section I,15 and monopolizing, attempts to monopolize, and 
combinations or conspiracies to monopolize under section II in interstate 
commerce.16  The Sherman Act went significantly further than common 
law because it established, among other things, absolute prohibitions 
enforceable by private damage actions.17  Subsequently, Congress added 
amendments to the Sherman Act at various times through 1950 to 
strengthen it.  The most important of these amendments are the Clayton 
Act of 1914,18 the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,19 and Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914.20
What the main goals of antitrust are has never been clearly 
articulated, due to the fact that the U.S. competition statutes are not clear 
about their goals.  The Supreme Court has described the language of the 
 12.  See infra note 13, at 4. 
 13.  For extensive background on the history of antitrust laws see William H. Page, The 
Ideological Origins and Evolution of U.S. Antitrust Law, 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 1,
2008 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L., at 4-17, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=692821 (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2010). 
 14.  Id. at 3.  In 1890, Congress took aim at the trusts with passage of the Sherman Act, 
named for Senator John Sherman (R-Ohio).  The Sherman Act outlawed trusts altogether. Sherman 
Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1887-1891) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2010)). 
 15.  Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1887-1891) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2010)). 
 16.  Id. at § 2. 
 17.  See Id. at § 7. 
 18.  15 U.S.C. § 12 (2010).  In addition to tightening legal standards of the Sherman Act, the 
Clayton Act prohibits exclusive dealing arrangements, tie-in sales, or mergers where the effect may 
be to substantially lessen the competition or to create a monopoly.  Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, §§ 
2-7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
 19.  15 U.S.C. § 13 (2010) (prohibiting certain price discriminations).  
 20.  Id. §§ 41-51 (prohibiting unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce or 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce).   
5
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U.S. competition laws as having “a generality and adaptability 
comparable to that found . . . in constitutional provisions.”21
Consequently, U.S. competition policy has never had one exclusive goal. 
Rather, it has had a different set of goals that reflected the political, 
social and economic concerns at the particular historical moment.  These 
goals centered around limiting large concentrations of economic power 
and dispersing economic and political power,22 protecting small 
businesses,23 protecting individual autonomy and economic 
opportunity,24 and protecting labor.25
Today, there is widespread consensus that the main purpose of the 
U.S. antitrust laws is to ensure a competitive market.26  Commentators 
 21.  Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). 
 22.  Congress was concerned about the monopoly power of the great industrial trusts.  See, 
e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 14,222 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Thompson) (noting that giant corporations had 
a “monopoly upon practically everything we produce, everything we eat and wear, and everything 
we use in the construction of the homes in which we live . . . .”).  Congress also believed that trusts 
sought not only industrial domination, but “political supremacy.”  Some members of Congress 
feared that the wealthy and privileged few would usurp political power, leading to socialism “as the 
properties of all the people pass into the hands of a few trust magnates.”  See 51 CONG. REC. 9167 
(1914) (remarks of Rep. Nelson). 
 23.  See 51 CONG. REC. 14,217 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Thompson) (“The trust wave swept 
over the country like a terrible cyclone, causing greater loss and destruction of property 
accumulated by individual effort than all of the storms and cyclones that have occurred since the 
flood.  Men who had devoted a lifetime to a particular trade or business found themselves bankrupt 
in a single night and, what was really worse, left in an entirely helpless condition . . . .”).  At times, 
the courts have even suggested that protecting small business supersedes even consumers’ interests 
in lower prices.  See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897), 
overruled by Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644 (1984).  
 24.  Members of Congress viewed competition and dispersed power as the “best environment 
for the advancement and the welfare of mankind in the individual initiative, the individual 
independence, and the individual responsibility.”  See 51 CONG. REC. 9167 (1914) (remarks of Rep. 
Nelson).  Some viewed competition law’s purpose as “encouraging investment, encouraging 
intelligent action and opportunity, but with the old Democratic principle underlying it all – ‘Equal 
rights to all and special privileges to none.’”  Id. at 9270 (remarks of Rep. Carlin).  These concerns 
were equally evident around 1950 when the disappearance of small firms was viewed as threatening 
the fabric of a decentralized democracy and depriving individuals of control over their lives.  See 95 
CONG. REC. 11,493 (1949) (remarks of Sen. Carroll); id. at 11,485 (remarks of Rep. Celler). 
 25.  It was believed that the trusts enjoyed a substantial degree of protection from strikes 
because of their economic strength.  See EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 993 (1978).   It was argued that an unintended 
consequence of the Sherman Act was its use by federal courts to enjoin strikes and limit the ability 
of workers to organize.  Id.  Congress corrected this in the Clayton Act when it declared that labor 
organizations are not conspiracies in restraint of trade and made clear that workers could act jointly 
in bargaining with employers without fear of prosecution under the antitrust laws.  15 U.S.C. § 17 
(2010). 
 26.  As stated in the DOJ/FTC International Guidelines:  “For more than a century, the U.S. 
antitrust laws have stood as the ultimate protector of the competitive process that underlies our free 
6
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have used an aphorism “protect competition, not competitors” 
articulated by the Supreme Court to successfully reorient the goals of 
antitrust laws.27  However, interpreting competition has often troubled 
courts and commentators.  Judge Bork has suggested in his book The 
Antitrust Paradox that competition should be interpreted as a “term of 
art, designating any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be 
increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial 
decree.”28  Subsequently, consumer welfare has emerged as a main goal 
of antitrust, and behavior was not deemed anticompetitive absent 
consumer harm.29  However, the courts and commentators still disagree 
over how broadly or how narrowly consumer welfare should be 
interpreted.30  This debate has particularly escalated in the wake of the 
fairly recent Supreme Court decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., where the court examined the issue of 
whether the same legal standards should be applied in monopoly and 
monopsony cases.31
Monopsony is the “mirror image” of monopoly, but on the demand 
side of the curve.32  It is essentially power over suppliers, not consumers.  
market economy.  Through this process, which enhances consumer choice and promotes 
competitive prices, society as a whole benefits from the best possible allocation of resources.”  See
DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 27.  Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
 28.  ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 61 (1978). 
 29.  See Steven C. Salop, Buyer Power and Antitrust:  Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power 
Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 686-87 (2005).  See generally Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Buyer Power 
and Antitrust:  Monopsony and the Ross-Simmons Case:  A Comment on Salop and Kirkwood, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 717 (2005). 
 30.  See Brook Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993);  
John Kirkwood, The Robinson-Patman Act and Consumer Welfare:  Has Volvo Reconciled Them?,
30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349, 360-61 (2007).  See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 
F.2d. 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85 
(D. Del. 1991). 
 31.  See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315 
(2007).  In Weyerhaeuser, a large saw mill operator in the Pacific Northwest was accused of driving 
out its rivals by simultaneously bidding up the price of inputs (alder saw logs) and cutting the prices 
on the output (alder lumber).  Id. at 315-16. 
 32.  In economics, buyer power is analyzed through monopsony model, where a single buyer 
purchases inputs for its outputs from many sellers. Under this approach, monopsony is the “mirror 
image” of monopoly, but on the demand side of the curve.  See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFERY L.
HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (1993). See also HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 
1.2(b)-14 (1994) (defining a monopsonist as “a monopoly buyer rather than a seller”); Roger D. 
Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 297-98 
(1991).  
7
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Some commentators have described it as an upstream market power in 
input markets, “the circumstance in which the demand side of a market 
is sufficiently concentrated that buyers can exercise market power over 
sellers.”33  Others simply define buyer power as a factor which “enables 
a firm or a group of firms to obtain from a supplier more favorable terms 
than those available to other buyers.”34  Under this approach, if the buyer 
(e.g., a retailer) can force sellers (e.g., suppliers) to reduce price below 
the level that would emerge in a competitive market, a buyer has market 
power.35  Commentators often use Wal-Mart as an example of a firm that 
has buyer power over its suppliers.36  Since buyer power is an upstream 
power in inputs markets that actually harms suppliers but potentially 
enhances consumer welfare, the issue becomes whether the conduct on 
the buy side of the market should be treated just as strictly as conduct on 
the sell side of the market.37  The Court in Weyerhaeuser held that 
conduct on the buy side of the market should be reviewed as stringently 
as conduct on the sell side of the market even if there is no direct 
consumer harm because illegal exercise of buyer power can in the long 
run be just as harmful to consumers as anticompetitive conduct 
occurring in the output market.38
The decision in Weyerhaeuser has implications on the debate about 
whether the narrow interpretation of consumer welfare standard is in 
accordance with antitrust goals and policies.39  Commentators have long 
 33.  Roger Noll, Buyer Power and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. No. 2 588, 589 
(2005).  
 34.  That is, a firm’s ability to achieve “more favorable terms” from suppliers than from other 
buyers.  See Margaret Bloom, Retailer Buyer Power, 2001 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 395, 397 (B. 
Hawk ed., 2000). 
 35.  Id. 396-97. 
 36.  Stephanie Wagner, Note, Big Box Living Wage Ordinances:  Upholding Our Constitutive 
Commitment to a Remunerative Job, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 359, 368 (2008) (arguing 
that Wal-Mart, due to its immense market share, has the ability to demand prices from its suppliers, 
essentially wielding monopsony power in the marketplace because it can act as a sole buyer, giving 
it the power to tell suppliers what price Wal-Mart is willing to pay them). 
 37.  To address this issue, some commentators argued that “[w]here buyer conduct clearly 
harms suppliers but does not benefit consumers, the impact on suppliers should be dispositive.”  See
Kirkwood, supra note 30.  See also Telecor Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 
1133-34 (10th Cir. 2002).  On the other hand, at least one court has held that in cases involving 
conduct that clearly harms suppliers but consumers might benefit from it, the impact on consumers 
is decisive.  Baltimore Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artist Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 
1989) (holding that an agreement among film distributors to refrain from bidding against each other 
for films was not illegal because it might increase consumer welfare by lowering prices). 
 38.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007). 
 39.  Kenneth Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not the Best?, 2 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29, 30 (2006).  See also THOMAS ROSCH, FTC, MONOPSONY AND THE 
8
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proposed a broader interpretation of “consumer welfare,” something 
akin to “total welfare,” and argued that seeking efficiencies is the best 
way to enhance consumer welfare.40 The efficiencies approach suggests 
that the long-run interest of consumers in the benefits from efficiencies 
may be as important as their immediate interest in lower prices.41
Professor Brodley has articulated three types of efficiencies that 
ultimately increase consumer welfare—production, innovation, and 
allocative efficiencies.42  Although it seems that antitrust authorities 
have acknowledged that competition policy may not have a single goal 
and are working to accommodate the goals of enhancing efficiencies and 
promoting consumer welfare, it was suggested that “delayed benefits 
from efficiencies (due to delay in the achievement of, or the realization 
of consumer benefits from, the efficiencies) will be given less weight 
because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”43
Nevertheless, the current goal of antitrust can be summarized as 
promoting consumer welfare by enhancing efficiencies. 
B. Goals and Policy Behind Patent Laws 
The roots of intellectual property in the United States stem from the 
U.S. Constitution where the Framers authorized Congress “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
MEANING OF “CONSUMER WELFARE”: A CLOSER LOOK AT WEYERHAEUSER 1-2 (Dec. 7, 2006) 
(address before the 2006 Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review) (“Courts and federal law 
enforcement officials routinely invoke ‘consumer welfare’ as the guiding principle behind their 
application of the antitrust laws.”), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/061207miltonhandlerremarks.pdf. 
 40.  Heyer, supra note 39, at 2.  See generally Laura Alexander, Note, Monopsony and the 
Consumer Harm Standard, 95 GEO. L.J. 1611 (2007). 
 41.  See generally Alexander, supra note 40.
 42.  Id. See also Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:  Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987) (“Production 
efficiency is achieved when goods are produced using the most cost-effective combination of 
productive resources available under existing technology.  Innovation efficiency is achieved through 
the invention, development, and diffusion of new products and production processes that increase 
social wealth.  Allocative efficiency is achieved when the existing stock of goods and productive 
output are allocated through the price system to those buyers who value them most, in terms of 
willingness to pay or willingness to forego other consumption.”).  In the context of buyer power, 
allocative inefficiency occurs when too few resources are devoted to an activity:  too little output is 
produced by a monopolist and too few inputs are hired by a monopsonist.  This argument presumes 
that this inefficiency is harmful to consumers even if no direct effects can be demonstrated.  See
Brodley, supra.
 43.  See DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 32 n.37 (1997), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm#N_37_ (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). 
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Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”44  The Patent Act of 1790 was the first act enacted by 
Congress and, for the first time in American history, the law gave 
inventors rights to their creations.45  The Patent Act of 1790 defined the 
subject matter of a U.S. patent as “any useful art, manufacture, engine, 
machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or 
used” and granted the applicant “the sole and exclusive right and liberty 
of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used” of his 
invention, for a period of fourteen years.46  Over the period of the last 
two centuries, the requirements of novelty, utility, non-obviousness, and 
the period of patents have been developed through patent law reforms.47
 44.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 45.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, l Stat. 109-110 (repealed 1793). 
 46.  Id.
 47.  See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 16 (2004). 
See also Patent Act of 1952, ch. 10, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 100-04 (2010)). Section 102 provides ground for obtaining a patent: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless- 
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in 
a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof 4 the 
applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of 
the application for patent in the United States, or 
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or 
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an 
inventor’s certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign 
country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an application for 
patent or inventor’s certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the 
application in the United States, or 
(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 
122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for 
patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United 
States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international 
application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for the 
purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the 
international application designated the United States and was published under Article 
2l(2) of such treaty in the English language; or 
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or 
(g)(l) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 291, 
another inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section 104, that 
before such person's invention thereof the invention was made by such other inventor 
and not abandoned, suppressed or concealed, or (2) before such person's invention 
thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not 
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this 
subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and 
reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was 
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Ever since the early beginnings of the intellectual property laws, 
commentators and scholars have been arguing over whether it is justified 
to give exclusive rights in intellectual property, given that intellectual 
property is not like other kinds of property.48  A great amount of 
scholarly work has been devoted to the debate over whether intellectual 
property should be considered a property like other kinds of property, 
and it is now an accepted view that intellectual property is just another 
form of property and should be treated no different than other kinds of 
property.49  In addition to an argument that intellectual property is a 
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the 
other. 
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010). 
 48.  See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 
614-16 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (discussing information’s properties of indivisibility and 
inappropriability); Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab:  Protect Innovation, Not 
Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (discussing differences between tangible and intellectual 
property).  See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R.
LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 1-5 (2d ed. 2004); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of 
Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-904 (1997) (discussing growth in use of propertization 
rhetoric); Tom Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?:  The Philosophy of Property 
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990) (reviewing natural law and 
utilitarian arguments for intellectual property rights); Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property:  
The Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2005) (discussing 
implications of using property rights label, particularly for copyright law).  For an argument that 
Lockean natural rights philosophy, as well as Benthamite utilitarianism, influenced the development 
of patent theories in the eighteenth century, see Adam Mossoff, Comment, Rethinking the 
Development of Patents:  An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001).  
Compare John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1077 (2005) (arguing that intellectual property should be viewed as a species of property), 
with Mark A. Lemley, What's Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2005).  
The Department of Justice also moved from a position of hostility to patents and copyrights to an 
embrace of patents and copyrights as just another form of “property.”  See 4 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH), ¶ 13,126, at 20,709 (1995) (remarks of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass’t Attn’y Gen, 
Antitrust Div. of DOJ, made on Sept. 21, 1972).  Charles F. Rule, then Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General in the Antitrust Division, made the linguistic shift clear.  Patents and copyrights are not 
“evil monopolies,” he wrote.  They “simply create property rights.”  See Charles F. Rule, The 
Administration's Views:  Antitrust Analysis After the Nine No-No's, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 365, 367
(1986).
 49.  Rule, supra note 48, at 367.  The federal antitrust enforcement agencies have endorsed 
the property-rights approach in their guidelines for the licensing of all “intellectual property,” taking 
as their basic approach the view that “the same general antitrust principles” should apply to conduct 
involving “intellectual property” as apply to conduct involving “any other form of tangible or 
intangible property.”  See DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 2.1, at 3 (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf; 4 TRADE 
REG. REP. (CCH), supra note 48, ¶ 13,132, § 2.1, at 20,733. 
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property no different than other kinds of property, scholars and theorists 
have often used the utilitarian or economic incentive framework to 
justify giving exclusive rights to inventors.50 The theory is that giving 
investors exclusive rights in intellectual property creates incentives to 
invent that otherwise would not be there.51
The extensive debate over justification for exclusive rights in 
intellectual property has raised the question whether intellectual property 
laws really are about property rights or about promoting innovation. The 
fact that intellectual property is considered just another kind of property 
makes it difficult to argue that intellectual property laws are not about 
property rights; however, commentators have vigorously argued that 
intellectual property is about promoting innovation.52  In order to support 
their position, those who argue that intellectual property is about 
promoting innovation often point to the language of the Constitution and 
requirements for obtaining intellectual property rights, arguing that they 
are designed to create incentives to innovate and, ultimately, to promote 
innovation.53  This position has been supported by the Supreme Court, 
which made clear that in the patent context, the ultimate purpose of the 
act is to promote innovation: 
[The] purpose [of patent power] has two dimensions.  Most obviously 
the grant of exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries 
is intended to encourage the creativity of “Authors and Inventors.”  
But the requirement that those exclusive grants be for “limited Times” 
serves the ultimate purpose of promoting the “Progress of Science and 
useful Arts” by guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the 
public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires.54
Furthermore, the landmark decision in Mazer v. Stein made it 
piercingly clear that although patent statutes are designed to strongly 
reward the owner of patents rights in order to encourage inventions, 
patent statutes make reward to the owner a secondary consideration.55
 50.  See First, supra note 48 (providing an extensive background and discussion on this issue). 
 51.  First, supra note 48.  See also DOJ, ANTITRUST DIV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
ANTITRUST LAWS: PROTECTING INNOVATORS AND INNOVATION (1995) (address by Richard J. 
Gilbert, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div. of DOJ, before the Annual Winter Meeting of the 
Licensing Executives Society), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0130.htm 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
 52.  See First, supra note 48. 
 53.  First, supra note 48.
 54.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 55.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).  See also, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
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“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner 
a secondary consideration.”  However, it is “intended definitely to 
grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without 
burdensome requirements; ‘to afford greater encouragement to the 
production of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the 
world.’”  The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
“Science and useful Arts.”  Sacrificial days devoted to such creative 
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.56
Clearly, the idea that the purpose of intellectual property laws is 
primarily to promote innovations and secondarily to reward the property 
rights owners is now deeply embedded in intellectual property law. 
III. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ANTITRUST LAWS
Are the patent system and antitrust laws in conflict?  Is there a 
tension between the need to protect the rights of intellectual property 
owners and the need to protect consumers?  At first sight, the patent 
system and antitrust laws appear to be in conflict because the patent 
system gives to the owners of patent rights a right to exclude competitors 
for a limited number of years, while antitrust laws protect robust 
competition.  However, modern thinking has dismantled the concept that 
antitrust and intellectual property are in conflict, and the common view 
is that the two bodies of law are complementary and are designed to 
promote innovations and enhance consumer welfare.57  Ward Bowman 
has offered arguably one of the most persuasive and comprehensive 
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).  See also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984) (“The monopoly privileges . . . [are not] primarily designed to provide a special private 
benefit.  Rather, the limited grant . . . is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . .”) (rejecting claim of copyright liability arising 
out of the sale of VCRs), superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 56.  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Washington Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)). 
57.  See DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2 (Apr. 2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.  
See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981); DOJ & FTC, supra note 
49, at 2 (“The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of 
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”).  
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interpretations of the interaction between the patent system and antitrust 
laws.  In his book Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic 
Appraisal, Bowman argues: 
In terms of the economic goals sought, the supposed opposition 
between these laws is lacking.  Both antitrust law and patent law have 
a common central economic goal: to maximize wealth by producing 
what consumers want at the lowest cost. In serving this common goal, 
reconciliation between patent and antitrust law involves serious 
problems of assessing effects, but not conflicting purposes.  Antitrust 
law does not demand competition under all circumstances.  Quite 
properly, it permits monopoly when monopoly makes for greater 
output than would the alternative of an artificially fragmented 
(inefficient) industry.  The patent monopoly fits directly into this 
scheme insofar as its central aim is achieved.  It is designed to provide 
something which consumers value and which they could not have at all 
or have as abundantly were no patent protection afforded. . . . 
. . . . 
The goal of both antitrust law and patent law is to maximize allocative 
efficiency (making what consumers want) and productive efficiency 
(making these goods with the fewest scarce resources).  In achieving 
this goal under either antitrust or patent law the detriment to be 
avoided is output restriction.  This may arise from monopolization 
which diverts production from more urgent to less urgent use or from 
legal rules requiring inefficient methods of production.  The evil then 
may be viewed as net output restriction after efficiency increases are 
accounted for.  Both antitrust and patent law seek output expansion not 
output restriction.  Competition deserves support insofar as it brings 
about this result.  And so it is with patents.  The temporary monopoly 
afforded by a patent, once a particular invention has come into being, 
will have all the output-restrictive disabilities of any monopoly.  The 
argument for patents is that without this temporary monopoly there 
would be insufficient profit incentives to produce the invention, and 
that because an invention is profitable only if consumers are willing to 
pay what the patentee charges, the consumers are therefore better off 
than they would be without the invention, even if they are charged 
“monopoly” prices.  If this is so, a trade-off (some monopoly restraint 
for greater output in the long run) is in the interest of socially desirable 
resource allocation.  An appraisal of alleged conflicts between antitrust 
law and patent law depends upon understanding the role of profits in 
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providing the incentive for undertaking efficient production of those 
things consumers value.58
According to this approach, the two laws have the same goal and 
are not in conflict at all.  Rather, they are complementary efforts to 
promote an efficient marketplace and long-run, dynamic competition 
through innovation.  The Supreme Court in Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of America, Inc. has also embraced this concept: "the two 
bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at 
encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”59  “Without 
intellectual property rights, the incentive to invest and innovate would be 
greatly diminished.  That result would be contrary to the very purpose of 
the antitrust laws, which is to promote the well-being of consumers by 
spurring efficiency, innovation, and investment.”60
Arguably, the two laws are complementary, at least in theory, and 
have the same goal—to promote fair competition and to bring innovation 
to consumers.  Nonetheless, it is indisputable that the two laws take very 
different routes to get to their goals:  antitrust laws via robust 
competition in the marketplace, the patent system via the right to 
exclude competition for a limited number of years in order to protect the 
ability to earn a return on the investments necessary to innovate.61
Although both systems spur competition among rivals and seek to 
promote innovation, it is too ambitious to say that the two laws are 
always complimentary and never in conflict.  The conflict between the 
two laws occurs when one of the laws gets out of its lane and gets in the 
way of another and, consequentially, hinders competition and 
innovation.  Throughout recent years, the two laws were fairly active in 
attempting to keep each other in the proper lane, and that has greatly 
helped to reduce the conflict between the two laws.62 Nonetheless, there 
are still many ongoing concerns, and the proper balance between the two 
laws is yet to be found. 
 58.  See WARD BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
APPRAISAL 1-3 (1973).  See also Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear,
59 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 874, 878-79 (1971). 
 59.  See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
 60.  See DOJ, supra note 51.
 61.  DiscoVision Assoc. v. Disc Mfg. Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1749, No. 95-345-SLR, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997). 
 62.  Tremendous progress has been made in attempting to reduce the conflict between the two 
laws, primarily in post-grant issues, that is, what can you do with the patent once you get it.  See, 
e.g., id.  Also, antitrust authorities issued Intellectual Property Guidelines in 1995.  See ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 49. 
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To begin with, the general sentiment is that patent rights are getting 
overprotected, while the standards to grant patents are lowering.63
Consequently, commentators argue that this expansion of patent rights 
not only makes protecting the property rights of inventors a primary 
consideration, but it also stagnates innovation, which ought to be the 
primary consideration of intellectual property laws.64  As put by Harvard 
professor John Lerner during his testimony before a House 
subcommittee: 
We've moved toward this litigious point over the past two decades as 
the courts strengthened the rights of patent holders while the standards 
to grant patents were weakened. It's a ‘perfect storm,’ a complex and 
intensifying combination of factors that increasingly makes the patent 
system a hindrance rather than a spur to innovation.65
Scholars also argue that overly expansive patent protection and 
overly excessive patents weaken innovation by unnecessarily shrinking 
the public domain and deterring innovative activity by others.66  Overall, 
the general consensus is that protection of intellectual property in 
general, and patents in particular, is totally out of control.67
Furthermore, there are widespread and growing concerns about the 
patent application process.  The notion is that the PTO issues far too 
many “questionable” patents that are unlikely to be found valid based on 
a thorough review of the sort one sees in patent litigation. As Shapiro 
and Lemley have pointed out: 
 63.  See Chabrow, supra note 10. 
 64.  See, e.g., Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 48, at 
1058-59.  Lemley was writing only with respect to over breadth, but his reasoning applies to loose 
patentability standards, as well.  See also First, supra note 48. 
 65.  See Chabrow, supra note 10. 
 66.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 249 
(2005).  See also Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation 
Policy, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1259 (2009).  The business method patents are particularly 
controversial.  For example, a patent has been issued for “Methods of Promoting Sleep Systems,” 
which covers a “method for selecting a sleep system” by “positioning a person on a mattress in a 
lying position,” extending one of their arms, positioning a pillow “underneath the person’s head,” 
and then forcefully moving the arm towards the person’s feet.  As explained in the patent: 
Finding the correct mattress can be a difficult task.  Within the United States there are 
literally hundreds of makes and models of mattresses, such as firm mattress[es], plush 
mattresses, and the like.  Selecting a mattress that will provide an appropriate degree of 
comfort and/or support to meet a person’s needs can be especially challenging. 
See U.S. Patent No. 6,997,070 (issued Feb. 14, 2006) (abstract) (example available at 
http://www.patentlysilly.com/patent.php?patID=6997070) (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). 
 67.  See First, supra note 48. 
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There are good reasons to doubt the efficiency of a system for granting 
patents under which 1) patents differ greatly in their commercial 
significance and value; 2) patent applicants are uncertain about the 
value of their ideas, but have far superior information to examiners; 3) 
patent applicants often have superior information as well about prior 
art, but are under no obligation to conduct a search for the relevant 
prior art; 4) patent applicants can persist repeatedly through the 
continuation process in seeking to have certain claims accepted by 
patent examiners; 5) the burden of proof falls upon the PTO to explain 
why a patent application will not be granted; and 6) patent examiners 
are faced with a flood of applications and have little time to devote to 
each one.68
The inefficiencies of the patent application process coupled with 
overprotection and expansion of patent rights have contributed to 
another problem:  the skyrocketing number of issued patents.69  At first it 
might seem that the skyrocketing number of issued patents is not 
necessarily something to be worried about.  After all, more patents mean 
more innovations right?  Ideally yes, but in reality that is not the case 
because a large amount of patents have a little or no value.70  On the 
other hand, the skyrocketing number of issued patents can also have very 
negative effects on competition and innovation.  Commentators point out 
that the patent explosion could injure competition and impede 
innovation by making it more difficult for rival inventors to sell 
competing products.  According to Professor Carl Shapiro, a “patent 
thicket” has formed, which he describes as “a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in 
order to actually commercialize new technology.”71  Firms in certain 
industries are said to fear that it is “all too easy” to infringe another 
patent accidentally and thereby risk liability.72  The testimony of an 
executive from Texas Instruments illustrates why:  “TI has something 
like 8000 patents in the United States that are active patents, and for us 
to know what's in that portfolio, we think, is just a mind-boggling, 
 68.  Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 83 
(2005), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patents.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
 69.  See USPTO ANNUAL REPORT: PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2009, supra note 3. 
 70.  Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value 
Intellectual Property:  The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405 
(1998).  See also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 68, at 75, 81. 
 71.  See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:  Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, in INNOV. POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
 72.  Id. at 121. 
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budget-busting exercise to try to figure that out with any degree of 
accuracy at all.”73  If a company with the resources of Texas Instruments 
cannot afford to know even what it has in its own patent portfolio, one 
can imagine how hard it could be for small potential entrants to 
determine their risks of triggering a patent infringement lawsuit. 
Due to the current state of the patent system, commentators keep 
debating over what can be done to improve the current state of the patent 
system.  The debate generally centers around well-worn discussions over 
how to strike an optimal level of patent protection and how to improve 
the patent applications process.74  These debates are not new. For 
example, President Johnson established a Commission on the Patent 
System in 1965 “To Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts” that made 
thirty-five recommendations on how to improve the patent system, and 
the majority of concerns were almost identical to current ones.75  As 
evinced by the statement of President Johnson upon releasing the report 
of the President's Commission on the Patent System, even the rhetoric 
was almost identical to current debates, and his statement was made 
forty-five years ago.76  Through the years, a number of scholars and 
policymakers have continued proposing meaningful reforms designed to 
limit the scope of patent protection and to improve the patent application 
process in order to reduce the number of improperly issued patents 
without causing genuine innovators to be denied patents.77  Some of 
 73.   FTC, TRANSCRIPT OF COMPETITION AND  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  LAW AND  POLICY  
IN  THE  KNOWLEDGE-BASED  ECONOMY WORKSHOP 743 (Feb. 28, 2002) (testimony of  Frederick 
Telecky, Senior Vice President and Gen. Patent Counsel, Texas Instruments, Inc. as of date of 
workshop), www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf. 
 74.  See generally DOJ & FTC, supra note 2; DOJ, supra note 2; FTC, supra note 2; GILBERT,
supra note 2. 
 75.  COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS”: IN
AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT
SYSTEM (1966). 
 76.  See John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Lyndon B. Johnson:  Statement by the President 
upon Releasing the Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (statement of then President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 2, 1966),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28057 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 77.  Some of the suggestions include the need to improve patent quality, arguing that the 
patent applications should be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at patent offices to make certain 
that they meet the statutory standards for patentability and patent scope.  Particular suggestions 
include raising the budgets of patent offices so that they can hire more examiners, taking advantage 
of the knowledge that companies and private researchers have by giving them more opportunities to 
initiate post-grant challenges.  Another common proposal is to establish a more effective opposition 
system in which interested third parties could challenge the validity of an issued patent before an 
administrative patent board.  See FTC, supra note 2.  See also 2000 United States Patent and 
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these proposals have been adopted.  For example, the seventh 
recommendation of President Johnson’s commission called for pre-issue 
publication, which was finally adopted in 1999.78  Nonetheless, in spite 
of tremendous efforts to improve the patent system, the already alarming 
situation has only gotten worse. 
While there might be many explanations why the patent system is 
not functional, one might be particularly worth considering. Empirical 
studies have cast doubt on innovation as the main reason for patenting, 
and it is now known that more and more companies are using intellectual 
property in general and patents in particular as a strategic tool.79  Studies 
indicate that most firms rely on patents the least among a variety of 
methods for protecting the returns from their inventions and that in no 
industry are patents identified as the most effective appropriability 
mechanism.80  Realizing this fact, scholars were curious why more and 
more patents are being sought if they are not helping most firms to 
protect their innovation returns.  It is now known that firms seek patents 
under many circumstances, and not only when they wish to protect a 
newly developed technology from imitation and exploit it 
commercially.81  For example, “start-up companies may try to get as 
many patents as possible because patents can help to persuade venture 
capitalists to fund young firms.”82  “Many large companies may want to 
build up their patent portfolios for the purpose of gaining leverage in 
licensing or settlement negotiations.”83 Some companies may use the 
“patent flooding” 84 strategy to anticompetitively disadvantage rivals by 
raising their cost.85 Alternatively, companies may pursue patents in an 
Trademark Office: Hearing on H.R. 63-845 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. 
of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 9. 
 78.   35 U.S.C. § 122 (2010). 
 79.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 8. 
 80.   Id. at 3. 
 81.  Id. at 7, 14. 
 82.  See OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION, PATENTS AND INNOVATION,
DAF/COMP (2007) 40, at 28 (Jan. 8, 2008) (from background note:  Box 1. The Problem of 
Measuring Innovation), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/10/39888509.pdf. 
 83.  Id.
 84.  With patent flooding, a firm files a multitude of patent applications that claim minor 
variations on a competitor’s existing technology.  Sri Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the 
United States and Japan, 40 IDEA J. L. & TECH. 393 (2000). 
 85.  Id. See also COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.  As the name implies, a raising rivals’ 
costs strategy generally involves actions by one firm to increase the costs of one or more 
competitors in order to gain an advantage in the marketplace.  The advantage of strategies that raise 
rivals’ costs over other strategies of unilateral monopolization (such as predatory pricing) is that 
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effort to block their competitors’ development activities.86  Some 
websites that provide general information on patents specifically advise 
others to “use patents to block competitors,” while some provide “ask 
yourself such questions as: . . . What patents do we need to block our 
competitors now and in the future?”87  Toyota, for example, has filed for 
patents on more than 2,000 systems and components for its best-selling 
hybrid Prius in order to cash in on the Obama administration’s tough 
new fuel-efficiency standards.88 It was suggested Toyota’s goal is to 
make it difficult for other auto-makers to develop their own hybrids 
without seeking licensing from Toyota.  Both the Ford Motor Company 
and Nissan Motor Company have already done so in order to make their 
hybrid vehicles.89
Unlike expansion and broadening of patents rights and 
inefficiencies of the PTO office, the known fact that patentees widely 
rely on patents for reasons other than protecting a newly developed 
technology from imitation and exploiting it commercially has not 
received as much attention as it should have.  If the patent system was 
not so broken, paying close attention to why patentees rely on patents 
would not be necessary or justified.  However, given that it is fairly easy 
to obtain a patent, including “questionable” or invalid ones due to the 
above-stated reasons, and given that it is accepted that most patents have 
little or no commercial potential/value and the Supreme Court has held 
that the patentee does not even have a duty to use the granted patent, a 
patentee can easily obtain a patent and rely on it solely to hurt 
competitors.90  When the Framers authorized Congress  “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
such strategies may require little or no short-run profit sacrifice to achieve the desired long-term 
goal of lessening competition in the marketplace.  Id. 
 86.  OECD, supra note 82, at 28.
 87.  See CASTLE ISLAND CO., Benefits of Having an IP Strategy:  Competitive Intelligence,
USING PATENTS AS KEY INFORMATION SOURCES FOR COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND BUSINESS 
STRATEGY (last modified Oct. 18, 2008), available at http://www.additive3d.com/patk_03.htm (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2010).  See also Taking Intellectual Property Seriously, CHIEFEXECUTIVE.NET
(Nov. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.chiefexecutive.net/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%
3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&tier=4&id=055DF3168CC44ABC
B5B7760EBE66C033 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 88.  See John Murphy, Toyota Builds Thicket of Patents Around Hybrid To Block 
Competitors, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2009, at B1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124640553503576637.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 89.  Id.
 90.  See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). 
20
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 5 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol5/iss1/2
7-TOKIC_MACROED 4.9.11.DOCM 4/12/2011 12:45 PM 
2011] INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ANTITRUST LAWS 39
and Discoveries,” the obvious intention was to create incentives to 
innovate by enabling inventors to exploit their invention commercially 
by not allowing free-riding and unjust imitation from competitors.  It 
was not a constitutional intention to enable patentees to use the patent 
system as an incentive to deliberately hurt competitors by purposely 
blocking their development or raising their cost, without any 
concomitant advance in the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”  
Unfortunately, it appears that is what the patent system is turning into, 
which clearly creates a conflict with antitrust laws and is extremely 
detrimental to innovation for numerous reasons.  For example, such a 
massive reliance on patents for “illegitimate reasons” inherently 
increases the number of issued patents, which, as described above, has 
proven to have negative effects on competition and innovation in and of 
itself.  Needless to say, the time and money spent on developing and 
filing for these “illegitimate” patents designed to hurt competitions could 
have been better spent on developing new and genuine inventions 
capable of promoting “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 
One might argue that finding an optimal level of patent protection 
and enhancing the efficiency of the patent application process will 
preclude patentees from relying on patents for “illegitimate” reasons, but 
that is unlikely to be the case.  As some commentators have correctly 
suggested “patents are either too weak or too strong.”91  The U.S. has 
traditionally favored strong protection of intellectual property rights and, 
given that intellectual property is proudly considered a key driver of the 
U.S. economy, the process is unlikely to change to a degree that will 
make it impossible for patentees to rely on patents for improper 
reasons.92  Along the same lines, the patent application process will 
never be as efficient as it would need to be to preclude patentees from 
relying on patents for improper purposes.  As explained by Professor 
Dreyfuss in her testimony before a House subcommittee:  
[s]ome bad patents always have issued and always will issue.  
Examiners are human; the information needed to properly assess 
patentability is not always available to them.  And to be candid, not 
every invention has the kind of commercial potential that merits the 
 91.  Ghosh, supra note 8. 
 92.  See DOJ, PREPARED REMARKS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ALBERTO R. GONZALES AT THE 
UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SUMMIT (2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0609291.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2010). 
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expenditure of vast resources and improper patents will always be 
issued.93
The following section of the article will explore alternative 
opportunities capable of precluding reliance on patents for solely 
“illegitimate” reasons and leading to a proper balance between the patent 
system and antitrust laws. 
IV. PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS
A. Pre-Grant:  Competition Policy with a Focus on Antitrust Intent 
Must Be Considered in an Initial Patent Application and the 
Applicant’s Interview with the PTO. 
In a fairly recent patent case, DiscoVision Associates v. Disc 
Manufacturing Inc., a district court held that a firm’s right to even file 
patent applications was qualified, “subject to abuse and antitrust 
scrutiny.”94  However, under the current patent system, issues related to 
a patentee’s subjective intent for patenting do not come up in patent 
applications, or during the applicant’s interview with the PTO, as the 
PTO is only interested in whether the patent application meets all 
statutory standards for patentability.95  The competition policy is not 
considered in the initial review of patent applications.  This paper argues 
that it should be.  This is not to suggest that antitrust authorities should 
be involved in initial review of patent applications. For several reasons, 
such as a lack of relevant technical expertise and limited resources, it has 
been suggested that competition authorities should not assume 
responsibilities related to the initial review of patent applications, but 
should assist the PTO in improving the patent granting process through 
informal cooperation designed to foster greater mutual understanding of 
each other’s fields.96
 93.  See 2000 United States Patent and Trademark Office: Hearing on H.R. 63-845 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 9, at 
112. 
 94.  DiscoVision Assoc. v. Disc Mfg. Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1749, No. 95-345-SLR, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997). 
 95.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010). 
 96.  See OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DAF/COMP 
(2004) 24, at 7 (Jan. 21, 2005) (executive summary by the Secretariat of the OECD), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/48/34306055.pdf.  Instead, commentators have suggested a 
variety of ways for competition authorities to assist IP agencies in taking steps to improve the IP 
granting process themselves.  The ideas included opening interdisciplinary dialogues with patent 
agencies to foster greater mutual understanding of each other’s fields, commissioning expert reports 
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However, while it would not be practicable for competition 
authorities to participate in the initial review of patent applications for 
the reasons states above, there is no valid reason why competition policy 
should not be considered in the initial review of patent applications, 
given that at least one court has held that firm’s right to even file patent 
applications is qualified, “subject to abuse and antitrust scrutiny,”97 and 
the notion that “reconciling intellectual property and competition policy 
requires recognizing that intellectual property law is a form of 
competition policy.”98  I am not proposing that the PTO consider the 
potential effect on the market before granting the patent.  Such inquiry 
would be overly time consuming, expansive, and speculative.  However, 
the PTO should make an inquiry into the patentee’s motives for 
patenting in order to evaluate whether the patentee has an 
anticompetitive intent. 
Obtaining a patent is a qualified privilege fairly analogous to 
obtaining a visa to enter the United States.  In both instances, a qualified 
privilege is granted for a certain period of time only if an applicant 
meets all statutory requirements to obtain a privilege and, subsequently, 
it must act strictly within the bounds of its statutory rights to maintain 
the privilege.99  For years, one of the most pressing issues in the 
immigration law was using temporary visitors’ visas, such as a B-2 
tourist visa or an F-1 student visa, to permanently immigrate to the 
United States.  Consequently, appropriate legislation was enacted, and 
the visa applicant’s intent is now an important part of visa application 
process for most temporary visas.100  The consular or port officials are 
that study a country’s patenting system to determine whether and how it is causing any undue 
problems, and holding seminars or hearings in which academics, public and private sector 
practitioners, and industry participants come together to discuss problems and possible 
improvements to IP policies.  Id.  Some scholars have joined in the call for competition and patent 
officials to meet regularly to share information and views about whether patents are having 
desirable effects and how matters might be improved by easing or tightening patent examination 
policies and processes.  See generally James Langenfeld, Intellectual Property and Antitrust:  Steps 
Toward Striking a Balance, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91 (2001). 
 97.  See generally DiscoVision Assoc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24. 
 98.  Ghosh, supra note 8, at 345. 
 99.  See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Foreign Students (F-1) 
in Public Schools, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1269.html 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2010).  See also Patent Act of 1952, ch. 10, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (1952)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-04 (2010)); BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, Visa Denials, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, available at
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/denials/denials_1361.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 100.  See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 214(b), 104 Stat. 
4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2006)).The Immigration and Nationality Act, or 
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required to assess whether a visa applicant has impermissible immigrant 
intent, and if they develop a “reasonable belief” that a visa applicant has 
such intent, the visa applicant can be denied admission to the United 
States.101  The courts have clarified the concept of dual intent and 
immigration intent, as a whole line of immigration law cases have made 
a distinction between “fixed” immigrant intent, which is prohibited, with 
a mere desire to permanently stay in the United States if possible, which 
is not prohibited.102  Similar standards and inquiry should be 
implemented in the patent system, as the patent system is currently 
facing a similar conceptual problem:  patentees are using the patent 
system for unintended purposes.  This is not to suggest that the patent 
applicant should be denied what appears to be a perfectly valid patent if 
there are some concerns as to why the patent is sought.  However, if the 
patent officer develops a “reasonable belief” that a patentee is seeking a 
patent for reasons other than protecting a newly developed invention and 
has a “fixed” antitrust intent, not merely a desire to hurt competitors if 
possible, such patent application should be very closely scrutinized, and 
more information should be requested from the applicant. 
INA, was originally created in 1952. Before the INA, a variety of statutes governed immigration 
law but were not organized in one location.  The McCarran-Walter Bill of 1952, Public Law No. 82-
414, collected and codified many existing provisions and reorganized the structure of immigration 
law.  The Act has been amended many times over the years, but is still the basic body of 
immigration law.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC [DHS], Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextcha
nnel=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextoid=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVC
M10000045f3d6a1RCRD (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).  See also DHS, TEMPORARY MIGRATION TO 
THE UNITED STATES: NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS UNDER U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW 75-76 (Jan. 
2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Nonimmigrants_2006.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 101.  See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Visa Denials, supra note 99 
(explaining INA § 214(b)). 
 102.  After the INA was first enacted in 1952, courts have developed the concept of 
immigration intent.  See Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1960) (finding 
even though an alien wanted to finish his and his children's education in America, he only intended 
to stay temporarily as a visitor unless he could arrange a permanent legal stay).  See also Brownell 
v. Carija, 254 F.2d 78, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (finding nonimmigrant who entered for travel through 
the United States “does not become an unlawful entrant because he entertains a desire, purpose or 
intent to remain here if the laws of the country permit him to do so.  Such a purpose, so limited, 
could at best be only a hope”); Chryssikos v. Comm. of Immigration, 3 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1924) 
(finding that when a new bride entered the United States on a visitor’s visa with her permanent 
resident husband, she intended to depart when her visa expired, and to return only after her husband 
became a citizen).  In the case Lauvik v. INS, 910 F.2d 658, 660, 662 (9th Cir. 1990), the judge 
reversed the denial of an E-2 for an applicant who expressed the desire to immigrate but did not 
intend to immigrate if not permitted. 
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While one might argue that it might be nearly impossible to find 
such antitrust intent, it is hard to imagine that it would be any harder 
than finding an intent to form an agreement to fix prices or divide the 
territory in antitrust law, finding immigrant intent in visa applicants, or 
finding discriminatory intent against a protected class in constitutional 
law.  In addition to straight forward questioning of an applicant, there 
are varieties of factors that an examiner can consider in finding antitrust 
intent.  To begin with, because it is known that the reliance on patents 
significantly varies from industry to industry,103 the examiner can 
consider whether the patent is sought in an industry where patents are 
not commonly used and whether the applicant’s legitimate purposes 
could have been served by alternative means.  Such inquiries are not 
foreign to courts.104  Furthermore, the examiner can consider whether the 
patentee already has other patents in the same field concerning the same 
or a substantially similar invention.  If so, the examiner can inquire into 
the apparent commercial value of such patents and how/if the patentee 
used those other patents.  Considering competition policy with the focus 
on antitrust intent in initial review of patent applications will inherently 
put the patent applicants on notice that relying on patents for primarily 
anticompetitive reasons will not be tolerated. While the patent applicants 
may still try to “abuse” the patent system, the patent applicants will have 
to do much more in order to do so.  Informal cooperation with antitrust 
authorities designed to foster greater mutual understanding of each 
other’s fields would be particularly helpful to patent officers in the 
context of antitrust intent, as antitrust authorities have tremendous 
experience with finding impermissible antitrust intent. 
B. Post-Grant:  Intent Standards Must Be More Objective Across the 
Board and Antitrust Must Play a More Meaningful Role. 
One reason that enables patentees to rely on patents for 
“illegitimate” reasons is the current state of law on the role of subjective 
intent in patents. The role of subjective intent in patents has been 
debated in years past, and it has been on the table in many cases.105  The 
 103.  See COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
 104.  In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), the court questioned 
United Shoe’s acquisitions of patents, which suggests legitimate purposes could have been served 
by alternative means. 
 105.  For example, in United Shoe, the court questioned United Shoe’s acquisitions of patents, 
suggesting legitimate purposes could have been served by alternative means.  Id.  Similarly, in 
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 423-24, 430 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 
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prevailing view on the role of subjective intent in patents has been 
articulated in Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation 
(Xerox)106 where the court made it clear that in the absence of any illegal 
tying, fraud on the PTO, or sham litigation, the patentee’s subjective 
intent for obtaining a patent or enforcing its statutory rights is largely 
irrelevant.107  The court’s approach in Xerox appears sound as far as it 
goes.  If the patent holder has a valid patent and does not engage in 
“illegal acts,” inquiry into patentee’s subjective intent for enforcing its 
statutory rights is neither necessary nor justified.  To hold otherwise 
would inherently weaken the patent system.  Nevertheless, the issue of 
subjective intent in patents is far from settled.  That is so because intent 
standards to find those “illegal acts,” fraud for example, that would then 
justify inquiry into the patentee’s subjective intent are set too high and 
are highly subjective.  The fairly recent decision in Dippin’ Dots,108 after 
In re Bilski109 arguably the second most controversial patent case in 
recent history, is a good example of inadequacy and inefficiency of 
intent standards in patent law that inherently increase expected costs 
from legal errors. 
The Dippin’ Dots case arose out of a patent dispute between 
Dippin’ Dots and its former distributors.110  Dippin’ Dots was the holder 
of a patent covering a method for making a form of cryogenically 
U.S. 837 (1952), the Court found that the acquisition, non-use, and enforcement of “every important 
patent” in the field with a purpose to exclude competition, together with other anticompetitive acts, 
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.  More recently, in DiscoVision, a district court has held that a 
firm’s right to even file patent applications was qualified, “subject to abuse and antitrust scrutiny” if 
the firm sought “to expand the monopoly granted by the patent laws by misuse, agreement, or 
accumulation.”  DiscoVision Assoc. v. Disc Mfg. Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1749, No. 95-345-
SLR, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *24-26 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997). 
 106.  In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 107.  Id.  It is important to note that Xerox case was decided three years after Image Technical 
Services v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak), 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) reached an opposite 
decision.  At issue in Kodak was refusal to license patented works.  The court ruled that absent a 
legitimate “business justification,” unilateral conduct by the owner of intellectual property, 
including a refusal to sell or license, may violate the antitrust laws if it adversely affects 
competition.  The Court found that Kodak’s subjective intent to exclude competition from 
independent service organizations was the real reason for Kodak’s conduct and, thus, Kodak’s 
“business justification” disappeared.  Id.  It is important to note that Kodak has not been followed by 
other courts and commentators have widely criticized it, although some commentators have 
endorsed this decision.  Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1326-27.
 108.  Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 109.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 110.  Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341. 
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prepared beaded novelty ice cream products.111  When several of Dippin’ 
Dots’ former distributors terminated their relationship with Dippin’ Dots
in order to compete against it, Dippin’ Dots initiated a series of patent 
infringement lawsuits against its new competitors.112  The distributors 
defended on the grounds of inequitable conduct and a Walker Process 
counterclaim under section 2 of the Sherman Act based on undisputed 
facts relating to omission of information from the patent application 
regarding certain prior sales from the patent at issue that would render 
the patent invalid.113  In particular, Dippin’ Dots included a sworn 
statement in its patent application claiming that “the initial sales were in 
March of 1988,” while it was undisputed that sales were made in 1987; 
the 1987 sales were not disclosed by Dippin’ Dots in its application to 
the PTO.114 Under the Patent Act, sales made more than one year before 
the patent priority date trigger the on-sale bar.115
 The doctrine of inequitable conduct and the Walker Process
claim essentially operate as defenses in patent infringement lawsuits. 
The judicially created doctrine of inequitable conduct is the patent 
system’s response to invalid patents procured by deceptive conduct 
before the PTO.116  The Walker Process claim is its antitrust equivalent 
based on the Supreme Court’s holding that a claim under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act could be maintained against the holder of a patent who
obtained that patent through fraud on the Patent Office, assuming all 
other elements of a section 2 monopolization claim are met.117 While 
both defenses require a showing that the patent holder intentionally 
misrepresented or failed to disclose material information to the PTO, the 
primary distinction between the affirmative defense of inequitable 
conduct and a claim for Walker Process fraud is the heightened standard 
for materiality and intent for the latter.118  However, while the 
inequitable conduct defense merely denies the enforcement of a patent 
 111.  Id. at 1340.  Specifically, the patented method was for preparing, storing and serving a 
free flowing, frozen alimentary dairy product comprising six separate steps.  Id.
 112.  Id. at 1341. 
 113.  Id.
 114.  Id. at 1340-41. 
 115.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 116.  Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 117.  See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
The United States Supreme Court held that a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act could be
maintained against the holder of a patent who obtained that patent through fraud on the Patent
Office, assuming all other elements of a section 2 monopolization claim are met.  Id. at 177. 
 118.  Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346 (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 
141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).  
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that was procured by unclean hands, a successful Walker Process claim 
denies the enforcement of a patent procured by unclean hands and 
subjects the patentee to antitrust liability, including treble damages.119
Therefore, although the difference between inequitable conduct and 
Walker Process fraud claims seems merely technical, and the two claims 
very often arise in the same matter and are supported by the same 
evidence, the practical difference between the two claims is tremendous. 
The jury in Dippin’ Dots found for distributors and upheld both the 
inequitable conduct defense and Walker Process counterclaim.120 On 
appeal, the Federal Court also upheld distributors inequitable conduct 
defense.121  The court first found that omission of prior sales was 
material because the PTO would not have issued the patent if the 1987 
festival sales had been disclosed.122  The court then turned to the 
question of intent and found that although the evidence of Dippin’ Dots’ 
intent to deceive the examiner was “not particularly strong,” the court 
was allowed “to balance the relatively weak evidence of intent together 
with the strong evidence that [Dippin’ Dots’] omission was highly 
material to the issuance of the ‘156 patent and to find that on balance,
inequitable conduct had occurred.’”123  However, the court did not 
uphold the Walker Process counterclaim.124  The court did find that 
omission of the 1987 festival sales met the heightened standard of 
materiality for Walker Process claim.125  Nonetheless, the court found 
that omission of the festival sales, which was sufficient to prove intent 
for purposes of inequitable conduct, was not sufficient to prove the 
heightened standard of deceptive intent for Walker Process fraud.126
The court refused to balance the high materiality of omission against the 
lesser showing of deceptive intent, as it did to find inequitable 
 119.  Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 175, 176-77; 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“[T]he court may 
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”);  35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) 
(“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”). 
 120.  Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1342 (“The jury also found that both Jones and Schickli had, 
with intent to deceive, made material misrepresentations or omissions in violation of the duty of 
candor to the PTO.  It also determined that defendants Mini Melts, Inc. and Frosty Bites 
Distribution had proven all required elements of their antitrust counterclaim, including the requisite 
fraud on the PTO.”). 
 121.  Id. at 1346. 
 122.  Id. at 1347. 
 123.  Id. at 1346. 
 124.  Id. at 1348. 
 125.  Id. at 1347. 
 126.  Id. at 1348. 
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conduct.127  The court viewed the Walker Process claim as a “sword” 
and inequitable conduct as a mere “shield” and held that in order to use a 
“sword” Walker Process claimants had to prove intent to deceive the 
examiner independently.128  Nevertheless, the court held that omissions 
can form a basis for a Walker Process claim but, again, claimants had to 
affirmatively show separate actual evidence of Dippin’ Dots’ fraudulent 
intent.129  The court cited Nobelpharma case as a sole example of the 
kind of facts necessary to prove Walker Process fraud by omission.130
In Nobelpharma, the patent applicant had included a prior art 
reference in a draft, but then deleted that reference from its final 
application.131  The evidence of the actual deletion of the prior art 
reference by the applicant’s patent agent was sufficient grounds for the 
jury to find intent to defraud.132
Scholars were quick to criticize Dippin’ Dots on the basis that it 
both goes too far and it does not go far enough.  Those who claim that it 
goes too far point out that it unjustifiably expands inequitable conduct 
doctrine by allowing interference of deceptive intent without any 
evidential support.133  Those who claim that it does not go far enough 
argue that it precludes meaningful role of antitrust in the patent 
system.134  On one hand, Dippin’ Dots does suggest that omission of 
highly material facts will lead to an inference of deceptive intent 
sufficient to prove inequitable conduct, even if the omission is purely 
innocent and in good faith.135  On the other hand, Dippin’ Dots also 
suggests that omissions, however material, cannot lead to an inference of 
deceptive intent sufficient to prove Walker Process fraud, even if 
omission is intentional and in bad faith.136  Regardless of which position 
is more plausible, one fact is certain:  both positions clearly indicate that 
there is a probability of error that a purely innocent actor can be found 
“guilty” of wrongdoing and a wrongdoer can escape a meaningful 
punishment.  The cost of error can be tremendous.  That is so because 
 127.  Id.
 128.  Id. (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 129.  Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1348. 
 130.  Id.
 131.  Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1062. 
 132.  Id. at 1072. 
 133.  See generally Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13
VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2008). 
 134.  Leslie, supra note 66. 
 135.  Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346. 
 136.  Id.
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the error can lead to overdeterrence costs if it causes potential patentees 
to go way beyond the feasible level of precaution in order to avoid 
potential penalties for material omissions.  At the same time, the error 
can also lead to underdeterrence costs if patentees discount the 
likelihood of ever being subjected to rigorous antitrust liability for even 
intentional omissions due to the fact that a “sword” provided by the 
Walker Process claim will not be available to alleged infringers.137  As 
some have suggested, if the only punishment for intentional omission is 
to merely “return” the patent, that is unlikely to deter future intentional 
omissions, just as if the only punishment for robbing the bank would be 
to require a robber to return the money, that would unlikely deter future 
robberies.138  Consequently, the patentees will not be discouraged to rely 
on patents for “improper reasons,” which can ultimately lead to an even 
higher number of valid and invalid patents that inherently hurt 
competition and stifle innovation. 
This highly controversial case clearly illustrates the inadequacy and 
inefficiency of intent standards in patents.  It is precisely the type of 
approach to intent that was rejected by Cass and Hylton in their 
extensive and widely-cited study on the role of intent analysis in 
antitrust law, but they have specifically acknowledged that their 
framework applies to other areas of law as well.139  Cass and Hylton 
rejected the two extreme normative positions on the role of intent:  the 
view that intent should play no role in legal analysis, and the view that 
intent should be determined for most purposes by a subjective inquiry.140
The court in Dippin’ Dots, however, seemed to follow these two extreme 
normative positions.  On one hand, intent played no role in finding of 
inequitable conduct as the court focused solely on the high materiality of 
omitted fact without any regard to intent to deceive.141  On the other 
hand, the court sought highly subjective evidence of the patentee’s state 
of mind, such as the evidence in Nobelpharma, to find Walker Process
claim and subject the patentee to antitrust damages.142  Cass and Hylton 
rejected the two normative positions and argued in favor of a more 
 137.  There are also administrative or litigation costs as alleged infringers will likely seek a 
“shield” provided by inequitable conduct defense in virtually every case involving omissions.  See
Wasserman, supra note 133. 
 138.  Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 101, 173 (2006). 
 139.  Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 658 (2000). 
 140.  Id.
 141.  Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346. 
 142.  Id.
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objective approach to intent finding that objective approach to intent 
ultimately leads to minimizing the expected costs from legal errors.143
In particular, they have argued that an “objective specific intent” should 
be the proper intent standard in antitrust and other areas of law.144  Their 
definition of “objective specific intent” provides in part: 
[T]he term specific intent is not synonymous with subjective intent,
although the two are frequently used as synonyms both in antitrust law 
and in other fields.  A “subjective intent” standard requires the plaintiff 
to produce evidence of the defendant’s actual state of mind.  In 
contrast, we use specific intent here to describe an inquiry conducted 
on the basis of objective evidence.  Rather than asking for direct 
evidence of what the defendant had in mind, the objective approach 
asks what state of mind can reasonably be attributed to the defendant 
in light of his actions.145
Such an objective approach to intent would be particularly useful in 
patents because it would allow courts to consider a variety of available 
“external” factors to determine what state of mind could reasonably be 
attributed to the defendant in light of his actions.  These “external” 
factors, such as the type of industry,146 the commercial potential/value of 
the patent, and the patentees’ conduct in relation to the use or non-use of 
the patent, could help courts to inquire into the patentee’s motives for 
patenting.  In turn could explain the patentee’s state of mind by 
suggesting, for example, a lack of mistake or knowledge in omissions 
and misrepresentations that would otherwise negate intent to deceive, as 
was the case in Dippin’ Dots.  Consequently, that would open the door 
for a more meaningful role of antitrust in post-grant issues and enable it 
to confidently swing its “swords” in the right direction without a fear of 
causing innocent “casualties.”  All together, by adopting a more 
objective approach to intent in patents across the board, the courts would 
be better positioned to minimize the cost from legal errors, to deter 
future misconducts and, ultimately, to start putting an end to reliance on 
patents for solely “illegitimate” reasons without causing genuine 
innovators undue hardship. 
 143.  Cass & Hylton, supra note 139, at 742. 
 144.  Id. at 659. 
 145.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 146.  See COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
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V. CONCLUSION
The notion that the patent system and antitrust laws are in conflict 
has long been dismantled as it is now accepted that the two laws 
ultimately have the same goals:  promoting innovations and enhancing 
consumer welfare.  Nonetheless, the proper balance between the two 
laws is far from being found.  As this article has illustrated, the patent 
system is currently more of an obstacle to innovation and competition 
than their promulgator.  It is not only in crisis, it is so broken that it 
practically enables patentees to rely on patents for solely anticompetitive 
reasons without any concomitant advance in the “Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,” and studies show that patentees are not reluctant to do 
so.147  The broken patent system cannot be fixed with chewing gum and 
duct tape.  Any meaningful attempt to improve the current state of the 
patent system will have to recognize an overlooked fact that patentees 
seek patents under many circumstances, rather than only when they wish 
to protect a newly developed technology from imitation and exploit it 
commercially.  This article has argued in favor of a more extensive 
inquiry into the patentee’s subjective intent for patenting, which is fairly 
limited under the current law in both pre-grant and post grant issues.  In 
particular, this article has suggested that the competition policy with a 
focus on antitrust intent should be considered in the initial review of 
patent applications, and the approach to intent standards in post-grant 
issues must be more objective across the board, so that antitrust’s 
“swords” can be used more often in patent cases involving allegations of 
a patentee’s misconduct in order to deter future misconducts, start 
putting an end to reliance on patents for “illegitimate reasons” and, 
ultimately, minimize the cost from legal errors.  However, it is important 
to note that this article does not suggest by any means that antitrust 
competition authorities should assume responsibilities in the initial 
review of patent applications or that the patentee’s “improper” 
subjective intent for patenting should make a perfectly valid patent 
unenforceable.  The article has argued, however, that although subjective 
intent for patenting should not be viewed as a red light at the intersection 
between the patent system and antitrust laws, it must be an important 
arrow that directs the traffic when other signs are invisible, as was the 
case in Dippin’ Dots.
 147.  See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 4. 
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